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ABSTRACT
Three main arguments are made in this study: The first
is that law should be approached as a central arena of
con+fl i. c:t where rights are not absol ute, but: rel ati ve,
and where changes occur as the balance of power in
society changes.
The second argument is that illegal urban development on
the eastern boundaries of Amman cannot be seen as a
phenomenon independent of the dramatic socio-economic
changes that occurred in the past century.
The third argument, contrary to the common wisdom in the
field of planning, is that residents of illegal
settlements do not obtain securi ty of tenure unless they
consolidate. Thus, consolidation leads to security of
tenure instead of the other way round.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When analysts address issues of legality of urban
settlements., they tend to use a myopic and ahistorical
approach in defining rights to land. The categories
used are often reduced to "land ownership" and "land
invasion". This study is an attempt to understand how
the legal system of a country affects, and is affected
by, the struggle among social groups for the control of
land. The legal system has significance only as far as
the state can enforce it and, thus, force the other
groups in society to conform to the law of the state.
However, when the state is unable to force reality to
conform to the law, it is faced with few alternatives;
it either has to modify the law to accommodate for the
other groups' interests and perceptions of "justice" or
accept a worse situation in which a gradual divorce
emerges between the law and its enforcement, that is, a
situation in which law lacks both legitimacy and
authority, and in which contesting groups may enforce
their own "laws". The state often ends up choosing the
first alternative.
Thus, analysts should approach law as a central
arena of conflict where rights are not absolute, but
1
relative. To make the above arguments, I have picked a
particular case to analyze in Jordan. People's loyalty
to the traditional tribe is slowly being replaced by an
affiliation with the state-as-nation.
All land in Jordan today is registered under either
private or public ownership. The system of private
ownership is a recent phenomenon in the history of
Jordan. The land system in the region before the
creation of the state of Jordan was very different.' It
was a tribally based system in which land was musha
(shared) among the members of the village or the tribe.
The process of breaking up the old musha system and
introducing the freehold system took a long time (it
began in the early 1930's and is not over yet). During
this long period, dramatic changes in the social,
poiitical, and economic characteristics of the country
occurred. Naturally, these changes affected the land
settlement policy; after the state had granted two
thirds of the land it controlled in the 1930's and
1940's to individual owners, it became much more
reluctant in the 1970's to grant land.
Today Jordan is a state committed to a free
enterprise economy with a strong public and private
sector, and the old tribal structure is fading away as a
social structure.
Jordan is a suitable case study because the legal
2
system is a recent phenomenon, has been superimposed on
a tribal system that is gradually fading.
In this study, I selected a distinct geographical
area within Jordan to analyze. This area is officially
referred to as Utl ez-Zarqa and Ruseifa (the
uncultivated land of Zarqa and Ruseifa). This region is
located east of Amman.the capital, west of Zarqa, the
second largest city in Jordan, and north of Ruseifa, a
medium size town (see figure 1). The Yajouz Road is a
15m wide east-west carriageway that forms a major artery
through the site, and connects the three cities
together.
Primary and secondary sources of information were
utilized in this study. In the first three sections,
secondary resources were used to document the historical
development of the social, economic, and political
developments and their effects on land. In the fourth
section, a mixture of primary and secondary sources were
used. The fifth and sixth sections rely mainly on
primary sources of information.
In January 1986, I interviewed national decision
makers, local decision makers, local government
employees, tribal leaders, tribal members, and new
settlers. This was an attempt to view the spectrum of
perspectives on the issues involved. Another source of
primary data was field observations, which enabled me to
3
distinguish between much of the rhetoric and action,
between policy and practice.
I found that the unstructured interview format was
most suitable for my purposes since different persons
were asked different questions depending on their role,
position, and experience. This flexible structure also
allowed for a comfortable atmosphere in which the
interviewees were able to emphasize different aspects of
the problem they were more familiar with and express
their feelings towards issues. This helped in
broadening my understanding of the different perceptions
of each group.
This study will be divided into five sections: The
first will describe the land situation before the
British mandate and under Ottoman rule. It will be
shown that as early as the nineteenth century, the
region had two systems of land; one was the legal
Ottoman land code, and the other the traditional musha
land system. It will be shown how the Ottoman code was
put to serve the interests of the Ottoman Empire and not
the local communities. The second section will cover
the dramatic transformations in the state and the
society between 1921 and 1973, that is, the period of
British mandate, the creation of the state, and the post
1948 war period and the Palestinian influx. I will show
how the British dismantled the traditional musha system
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and introduced the Land Settlement Law, which transfers
communal ownership into individual freehold. The third
section will cover the period 1973 until 1983. In this
section, the oil dependent economy of the country will
be explored as it affected the different groups
involved. The fourth section will cover the post-1983
period. Finally, the fifth section will describe the
state's legalization process of the Yajouz Road area,
and the implications for planning.
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II. THE OTTOMAN PERIOD
All land in Jordan today is registered under either
private or public ownership. However the system of
private ownership known today is a recent phenomenon in
the history of Jordan. The actual land system in the
region before the creation of the state of Jordan was
very different. It was a tribally based system in which
land was musha (shared) among the members of the village
or the tribe. Doreen Warriner best defines the musha
system as " a stage of transition between the completely
communal property system...and the completely divided
property system" (Warriner, cited in Hamarneh, 1985:
77).
Two modes of production coexisted in the region.
One was a strong pastoral-nomadic mode in which Bedouins
practiced animal husbandry and primitive agriculture in
musha holdings (Hamarneh, 1985: 45). The other was an
agricultural mode in which settled communities depended
on agriculture instead of animal husbandry as the basic
source of subsistence (Hamarneh, 1985: 71). The nomadic
Bedouin tribes continually raided the settled
communities and extracted tribute from them, which
"helped retard the internal evolution of these
6
communities" ( Hamarneh. 1985: 4).
Most of the Ottomans' attempts to control the area
had failed because of their inability to control the
mobile and well-equipped Bedouin tribes. The camel was
the only animal able to cross hundreds of miles in the
desert and go without water for several days. The more
camels a tribe owned, the more powerful it was since
this facilitated its annual migration in search of
pastures and water. Access to pastures, oases, and
wells was a right shared by the whole tribe. However,
herds within the tribe belonged to individual households
(Hamarneh, 1985: 50). Camels also gave the tribe
flexibility to control and extract tribute from more
distant agricultural settlements. "Once tribute had been
extracted, the tribe would retreat deep into the desert
where they could be neither chased nor
subjugated." (Hamarneh, 1985: 49).
The struggle for subsistence was apparent not only
in raids by the Bedouins on settled agricultural
communities but also in raids between different Bedouin
tribes. When a tribe lost in a confrontation with
another tribe, it lost its access to pastures and water
sources it had previously controlled. This confined the
tribe to its locality (dirah) and thus forced it to give
up its exclusive camel husbandry and depend more on
other animals, such as goats and sheep. This transition
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in animal husbandry was to lead to the settlement of the
weaker Bedouin tribes and the gradual movement towards
cultivation (Hamarneh, 1985: 51). To have access to
land, the poor tribe had to pay tribute to the dominant
tribe. The Bani Hassan tribe was one of the poor tribes
that had settled through this process ( Hamarneh, 1985).
As for the strong tribes, such as the Bani Saker
and the Adwanthe sedentarization process took a
different route. By the end of the nineteenth century,
these tribes controlled vast areas of agricultural land.
This land was cultivated by non-tribal members who took
a share of the crop. As the wealth and herds of these
tribes multiplied and diversified, their mobility was
reduced. Thus some clans within the tribe started
settling, while others continued their traditional
nomadic life. Hence, the development of the forces of
production of the rich tribes was towards a semi-feudal
system and not a communal musha system such as that of
the poor tribes (Horani, 1978).
For the settled poor tribes, musha land was
distributed more or less equally among the various
clans. Then each clan divided its share into parts and
allocated them among its households. This system was
egalitarian in its division of musha land within a clan.
Nonetheless, not all shares of households across clans
were the same since some clans had more households than
8
others (Hamarneh. 1985: 77).
Musha land was reallocated within the clan every
two to nine years. This was done to adjust for deaths
and newly formed households, and to insure the rotation
of low productivity and high productivity plots to all
households. Thus, the individual farmer was not allowed
to plough the same land he had ploughed in the previous
period (Oddvar, 1976: 252).
The village musha system was very similar. Land was
divided among villagers into shares, and each villager
could cultivate an area equivalent to his share. The
location of this share changed every time land was
redistributed. The length of time was agreed upon by
the village community (Oddvar, 1976: 252).
Despite the impressive equality considerations in
this system, it had its own defects. Farmers lacked the
incentive to make long-term improvements on the land
such as terracing the land to protect it from soil
erosion, manuring the land, or growing forest and fruit
trees (Oddvar, 251). Walpole, who became the director
of the Department of Land and Surveys in 1946, described
agriculture in musha land as "more in the nature of a
mining operation than the practice of good husbandry;
the cultivator during his occupation took as much out of
the soil as he could and put nothing back" (Walpole,
1948).
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Because of these defects, many tribes and villages
selected trusted groups from their leaders to allocate
permanent partitions of the land to the households, with
each household getting a share in both the superior and
the inferior quality land.
Land to the east of the Jordan River remained under
Ottoman rule for four centuries, until the First World
War, when the British colonized the region. During the
first three centuries of their rule, the Ottomans
adopted a traditional Islamic system of land tenure.
According to this system, land was classified into two
categories:
1) Ushr lands: Regions that became Moslem by choice
and without resisting the Moslem state were considered
privately owned. Owners of such lands enjoyed the full
ownership of land but had to pay the Ushr tax, which is
one tenth of the yield of the land.
2) Kharaj lands: Regions that became Moslem after
resisting the Moslem state expansion were considered the
domain of the state. These lands were given to
individuals to cultivate. In return, the individuals
had to pay the Kharaj, which is a form of taxation
ranging between 25 and 50 percent of the yield of the
lands.
However, this system was never fully implemented by
the Ottomans since they lacked total control over the
10
region.
During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire
embarked on a program of reform. As part of this
movement for reform, the Ottoman Land Code was
introduced in 1858. The Land Code classified lands into
five categories (Ziadeh, 1979: 8):
1) Mulk lands: Private property held in full
ownership. Mulk land was limited to urban areas. Land
ownership comprises two rights: the raqaba, or right of
absolute ownership, and the tasarruf or the right to the
usufruct of land. Both of these rights belonged to the
individual in this category.
2) Miri lands: Property owned by the state. Most of
the agricultural land was classified as Miri land. The
raqaba or absolute ownership belonged to the state,
while the usufruct or tasarruf to the individual. This
land was either held as part of the royal-domain or was
leased to individuals to exploit it and pay dues or
taxes to the state through various conditions of tenure.
3) Wagf lands: " Land dedicated to God" or land held
in perpetuity with the income devoted to the upkeep of a
charity or the family of the constituter of the Waqf.
However, only Mulk land and not Miri land could be
transferred into Waqf land.
4) Mawat landp: "Dead land" or unoccupied land which
has not been left for public use. This part includes
11
land lying outside the confines of villages and
cultivated areas.
5) Matrukah lands: " Abandoned" land or Mulk., Miri, or
Mawat land that is reserved for public purposes.
The main purposes of the Land Code were
not to help the cultivator, but to establish a
claim to revenue by the government. In order
to tax every piece of land, it was necessary
to establish its ownership. The state's claim
that it owned all the land really only meant
that the state did not recognize ownership
unless the title were registered and the land
therefore taxable... In general the practice
was to grant title directly to the cultivator,
and to prevent any intermediary between the
government and the small individual owner.
HenceEthe Ottoman Land Code was] an attempt
to centralize the power of the administration
against the feudal or tribal forms in
existence. The object was to establish a form
of individual ownership as against the tribal
sheiks" (Warriner, 1948: 17).
Further, the Ottoman Land Code abolished (legally
at least) the musha system or any type of collective
ownership. Article 8 of the Land Code states that:
The whole land of a village or of a town
cannot be granted in its entirety to all of
the inhabitants, nor to one or two persons
chosen from amongst them. Separate pieces are
granted to each inhabitant and a title deed is
given to each showing his right of possession
(Ottoman Land Code, 1858).
The approach to introduce these changes was to
diminish the differences between mulk lands and miri
lands. Upon payment of a prescribed fee, the holder of
miri land could sell and inherit miri land. However,
the state preserved its right to deprive the miri holder
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of his possession if the land was left uncultivated for
a period of three years (Ziadeh, 1979: 9).
In order for such reforms to take place, it was
necessary to establish the ownership of every piece of
land through the registration of the tapu (title deeds).
However, this step was not carried out in most of the
region east of the Jordan River because of the absence
of state authority and the hegemony of the Bedouin
tribes. Even in regions were it was carried out, the
titles established did not correspond at all to reality.
The villagers falsified the titles in fear that the
registration was a preliminary step in being called up
for military service, or for taxation purposes. They
registered the property either in the name of the head
of the tribe, or in the name of a member of the family
who would not be liable for military service (Warriner,
1948: 18). These title deeds were ignored by the people
and they continued to farm according to the musha
system.
[CJomplete confusion resulted Efrom the above
situation], since there arose one situation
established by law under which certain owners
held titles to divided land, and a situation
existing in fact, in which the persons
cultivating the land had claims recognized by
custom or presumptive right, which were not
enforceable by law" ( Warriner, 1948: 18).
The power of the Ottomans and their ability to
enforce the law increased with time as the gradual
13
sedentarization process made the Bedouin tribes more
vulnerable to the Ottoman power. The Ottomans
established a garrison in the area in the second half of
the 19th century. Through this garrison they were able
to subjugate and collect taxes from the wealthy tribes,
such as the Adwan, who were already dependent on land
cultivation and diversified animal husbandry. The Adwan
were no longer able to charge other tribes and villages
tribute, and were further forced to pay animal tax
(Hamarneh, 1985: 62). Bani Hassan, one of the poorer
tribes (and one of the main three groups in our case
study), suffered heavily from an Ottoman expedition in
18663; "[Bani Hassan] were for the most part wedged
between powerful tribes and villagers willing to defend
themselves" (Hamarneh, 1986: 65). The Ottoman troops
killed a large number of the tribe and took almost all
its herds. Much of the tribe's most fertile territory
in the Jordan valley was appropriated. The tribe was
left with land in the less fertile region to the north-
east of Jordan. The boundaries of this area were the
town of Jerash to the west, Mafraq to the east, and
Zarqa and the Hijjaz railroad to the south (see figure
1.). Not all this land was cultivatable; areas to the
west and northwest were cultivated every season while
grazing and only scant cultivation occurred in the
southern and eastern parts close to the desert. The
14
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Khalayleh and Zawahreh clans within the tribe were
mostly herders rather than farmers. Thus, their share
consisted of less fertile strips of land at the southern
edge of the tribal holding (what is now called Jureiba
and Utl ez-Zarqa and Ruseifa).
To avoid agricultural yield taxes on the least
fertile holdings which of Bani Hassan, the clans
controlling these areas denied their use of the land for
cultivation or grazing. Thus, these areas were
categorized by the Ottomans as Mahlul land, that is,
land taken back by the state if for good reason it
remained uncultivated by its occupants. However, the
Bani Hassans continued to practice their scant
cultivation and grazing in these areas. "Still twenty
years after the expedition, the Bani Hassan seemed to
have recovered slightly. They began cultivating corn
patches and building mud huts; their herds of goats and
sheep were of fine quality" (cited in Hamarneh, 1985:
66).
By 1921, the endogenous social formations had
neither developed dominant social groups on the national
level nor generated a surplus to maintain their
political hegemony (Hamarneh, 1985: 5). Thus one could
speak of neither a "Jordanian" economy nor a "Jordanian"
society.
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In conclusion, it is neither the "Ottoman Land
Code" nor the musha communal land system that governed
and regulated the relations between the tribes, the
settled communities, and the Ottoman state. It was the
outcome of the struggle between the two legal systems
represented by the groups concerned and their
perceptions of "right" and "justice". The state of
"confusion" described by Warriner above reflects the
nature of "law" as described in this study: an arena
where social groups struggle to promote their interests
and claims.
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III. CREATING THE STATE AND TRANSFORMING THE SOCIETY
1921-1946: The British Mandate
After the first world war, the Ottoman Empire lost
its control over the Middle East to the British and the
French. East of the Jordan River became, for the first
time, a separate political entity named the Emirate of
Trans-Jordan. Great Britain's colonial policies were
not economically motivated but strategic. In fact,
there was a net positive transfer of value from Britain
to Trans-Jordan. Further, the budget of the government.
which was largely financed by the British, far exceeded
the productivity of the society-- a phenomenon that
continues to characterize Jordan today (Ameri, 1981:
73). This was not surprising. The area was poor in
resources, and the British were interested in it because
of its strategic importance as a central location with
respect to Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and the Arab
Peninsula (Ameri, 1981). British aid was provided to
build the administrative structure and, most
importantly, to build a security force that was able
maintain internal stability.
One of the main concerns of the British was
breaking up the traditional musha land system and
18
establishing the system of modern private ownership of
land'. On the 24th of July, 1923 Jordan was formally
separated from Turkey. Article 139 of the treaty
required Turkey to deliver to the British all the
records it possessed concerning land and property in
Trans-Jordan (Department of Lands and Surveys Annual
Report 1974: 13).
As these exogenous factors speeded the process of
settlement of Bedouins, land became more important for
local communities. Several village boundary disputes,
ownership disputes, and inheritance problems encouraged
the British to enact a special law in 1930 to form a
commission to investigate boundary disputes between
villages and to formalize village demarcation that had
already been established (Oddvar, 1976: 253).
The British were keen to get agricultural land
registered as private holdings so that a systematic
agricultural taxing system could be introduced to
generate local revenue for public expenditure and reduce
the subsidies provided by the British to run the
government. The Lands and Survey Department embarked on
a plan to survey and establish all agricultural villages
boundaries. With this accomplishment, Jordan "witnessed
1 In 1935 the High Commissioner came up with a
series of development schemes that he thought would
stimulate growth in the country. One of these schemes
was to expand the Land Department to expedite breaking
up of the musha system.
19
the birth of the (village entity) as a strong social
unit" (Oddvar, 1976: 253).
The second step was to settle individual rights
within the "village entity" and give farmers individual
titles to land (Oddvar, 253). For this purpose, the
Waters and Lands Settlement Law was enacted in 1933.
According to this law, village lands were divided into
sectors and quarters. In each quarter, the names of
landholders and their exact shares were established.
Individual plots were demarcated and plotted, and
farmers were given individual title deeds to their
plots. Although this land was still classified as miri
(state's land), the holder could enjoy all the rights
enjoyed by a private owner (except for inheritance,
since miri land is divided equally between male and
female heirs, while mulk land is divided unequally, with
the male getting twice the female's share).
As for tribal land, if land was cultivated, it was
treated the same way as village land. Uncultivated
tribal land, like any other uncultivated land at the
time, was of no interest to the state.
After the Lands and Survey Department completed the
demarcation and registration of agricultural land, the
next step was to embark on the demarcation and
registration of urban areas and rural settlements. The
existing layout of towns and villages was accepted as
20
is. Then the title deeds were settled through a certain
period. The owner of a property in the area had to claim
it officially, and others were given one month to object
to his right to ownership.
During the 1930's, the policy of the government
was to return the mahlul lands for a nominal price to
their former owners, or to peasants who would cultivate
them to increase government revenue through land
taxation. This led to a situation in which "corruption
was widespread and considerable mahlul land had been
taken away from its rightful owners by an unjust
official" (cited in Hamarneh, 1986: 172).
Thus, the Land Settlement Law resolved many
problems that existed in the musha system. Its positive
impact was in minimizing boundary disputes, stimulating
long term investment in agricultural land, and creating
a base for tax structure in the country. Its negative
impact was in facilitating the sale of land to large
owners, and the fragmentation of agricultural land
through inheritance (since there was no redistribution
mechanism in the new law), and finally the lack of
security of sharecroppers and tenants since the new law
completely neglected their rights2,
2 See Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East,
1948 for a more detailed analysis of the effects of the new law
on land fragmentation and the exploitation of sharecroppers and
land tenants.
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1946-1973: Creating the State
In 1946, Trans-Jordan was granted formal
independence. By that time the structural changes and
transformations of the country had started taking place.
These transformations were coupled with certain economic
activities introduced by the British such as
transportation systems and markets for imported
commodities. Thus, the transformation towards a nation-
state with a capitalist economy was advancing steadily.
After the early 1950's, the government turned its
attention towards economic and social development.
Since the private sector was weak and external aid came
through the central government, the government played
the main role in these plans. These plans were
disrupted and altered significantly due to the 1948 and
1967 Arab-Israeli wars. The economic implications were
the loss of most of the fertile and developed areas of
the region. The social impact was the forced migration
of thousands of Palestinians from the West to the East
Bank. In 1947 Amman's population totaled about 60,,000.
After the occupation of Palestine in 1948 the population
of Amman increased to 100,000. Most of the refugees
were settled in refugee tent camps in the eastern parts
of Amman. These tent camps were consolidated gradually
into settlements of tin and corrugated sheet shacks, and
ultimately into concrete dwellings. The war of 1967
brought an additional 150.,000 Palestinian refugees to
settle in Amman. Those also settled mainly in the
eastern parts in tents and shacks, and under overcrowded
conditions.
By the late sixties, the Bani Hassan tribe was
completely settled. Most of its members were still
working in cultivation and animal husbandry. However,
their less fertile land in Utl ez-Zarqa and Ruseifa was
still not legally theirs. It was categorized as
"unsettled mahlul land".
In an interview with one of their tribal leaders,
he explained that the tribe assumed that the transfer of
land would be a routine procedure like that in other
regions in the country. In the early 1960's, the
settlement of titles in the area was starting; the land
was surveyed and demarcated, and lists of holders of
land were prepared by the Land and Survey Department.
But the process was suspended when areas south of the
Bani Hassan lands were found to be rich with phosphate
minerals. The government decided to suspend the title
settlement process, and leased the land in the area to
the Phosphate Company. The Bani Hassans were promised
that the land would be registered in their names once
the extraction of phosphate was over within an estimated
ten year period. Officials from the government,
23
however, maintain that the areas north of Ruseifa never
belonged to the Bani Hassan tribe.
24
IV. 1973 - 1983: AN OIL ECONOMY WITH NO OIL
As a Jordanian economic analyst sarcastically, but
rightfully, pointed out, Jordan can claim the world's
only non-oil exporting oil economy (The New York Times,
April 2, 1983). The country enjoyed a remarkable
economic boom between 1973 and 1983 as a result of the
grants from oil producing Arab governments and
remittances from expatriates working in the Arabian Gulf
states. During that period, grants from the Arab
countries rose more than 16 fold, accounting for about
one third of GDP ( Gross Domestic Product) and covering
about one half of the Jordanian trade deficit.
Remittances of Jordanians working in the Gulf states
rose from $15 million in 1970 to $900 million in 1981,
accounting for about one quarter of the GDP, and
covering 40% of the trade deficit (Inception report,
1965). Real annual growth rates of the gross national
product (GNP) increased at an average of 10% a year,
gold and foreign exchange reserves increased 6 fold, and
capital formation increased 11 fold (Satloff,8).
As most of the Arab and International aid was
channeled through the public sector, the growth in the
bureaucracy was enormous. By 1975 total government
expenditure accounted for 75% of the country's GDP. In
the same year, the government employed 40% of the labor
force in the country, and accounted for over 33% of the
economic consumption expenditure and over 50% of the
capital formation (cited in Ameri, 1981: 117).
The repercussions of the economic boom for the
building industry and land prices were phenomenal.
Urban land prices increased five fold between 1970 and
1960. Government revenues from land registration
increased from JD 551,000 in 1971 to JD 24,479,000 in
1981. During the same period, the salary of an average
civil servant increased by a mere 50%.
Needless to say, this prosperous period was not
enjoyed equally by the different groups of the society.
However, a large segment of the urban working class was
able to reap some of the benefits of growth during the
period. Many were able to obtain work in the Gulf
Countries as professionals or skilled and semi-skilled
workers, and others who stayed behind were able to
obtain better wages as the demand for labor by the
building industry increased and the supply of skilled
labor decreased. Remittances sent back by migrant
workers to their families were mostly invested in land
and real estate due to the lack of secure alternative
investments. Thus, land was not only used as a
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production input and a consumption good (Harvey,
1982:ch.11) but also as a store of value (Gilbert, 1985:
132).
This period also brought more segregation with
rapid urban growth. Areas west of Amman municipality
were inaccessible to lower and middle income groups.
About 90'4 of the areas annexed by the municipality were
zoned as upper income residential plots that were beyond
the means of middle or lower income groups". Access to
housing or land for lower income groups became more
difficult than ever before. A study in 1979 found that
about 40. of the population of Amman lived at densities
of 4- 5 persons per room and that it was very common to
find 10 people living in one room. Such cases were
concentrated in the eastern parts of Amman, mainly in
Palestinian refugee camps. Thus, middle and lower
income groups were excluded from the formal housing
market despite the fact that their level of income
3 According to the National Planning and building
code of 1979, housing areas "A" and "B" (upper income
areas) should have a minimum plot size of 1000 and 750
sq.m. respectively, while housing areas "C" and "D"
(middle and low income) should have a minimum plot size
of 500 and 300 sq.m. respectively. Given the single
family housing pattern dominant in Jordan, this minimum
size arrangement makes the formally subdivided areas
inaccessible to lower income groups. In a study done by
the World Bank in 1985, it was found that "unsubsidized
housing at conventional standards,... is affordable only
by families in the upper third of the income
distribution, and then only by families which can make
down payments of twice or more their annual incomes"
(World Bank, p 73).
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seemed to have improved. As Gilbert rightfully
predicted:"Rapid land price rises will... affect the
pattern of urban location, most typically by
accentuating social segregation" (Gilbert and Healey,
1985: 11). In this case, it is not only through highest
bidding that the land gets allocated to upper income
uses, but through zoning regulations, building codes,
and other land use restrictions :
Urban land pricing and tenure arrangements,
existing practice in terms of plot size,
building forms and service systems,
established legal financing and institutional
arrangements all combined to deny [the poor]
people access to reasonable house at prices
they can afford (Fox and Jouzy, 1979: i).
Thus, an economic boom is not likely to be
accommodated by less segregation in space. In fact, the
evidence from both Jordan and Venezuela suggests that
in fast growing economies with limited productive
investment opportunity spatial segregation is likely to
increase. In such situations, this process of
speculation takes large areas of land out of the market,
thus limiting the supply and increasing the price.
Overcrowding, sharing, and all forms of informal
settlement cannot be seen as phenomena separate from the
formal land market. Both "processes are different
manifestations of urban development in a fast-growing
oil based economy" (Gilbert, 1985: 132).
During the 1970's, the state embarked on capital
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intensive development projects. The lack of public land
was a major source of hindrance to the implementation of
these projects. A study carried out in the late 1970's
identified an "enormous" deficit of public land. The
main reasons for the deficit were that:
Public agencies do not have the means to a
acquire land for needed public purposes. Part
of this inability is... the high cost of
land... But part of it arises from the
rigidity of the Expropriation Law... The
combination ---- lack of money and the
rigidity of the law ---- have made it almost
impossible to plan ahead regarding land
purchase for needed public uses. (Balqa-Amman
Region Planning Group, 1979: 111-5-10)
As a result of this deficit, the government enacted
a law in 1976 that ended a long traditional practice of
granting unused miri land (state land) to tribal members
for cultivation or residence.
Such a group is the Bani Hassan tribe. Parts of
their holdings were never properly registered (see
previous chapter). According to the new law, they were
invaders of public land in Utl ez-Zarqa and Ruseifa.
However, the Bani Hassan tribal owners were anxious to
cash in on the rising value of land in their area, as
the sharp rise in land prices in the western parts of
Amman forced many middle and lower income groups to seek
land outside the eastern boundaries of the city. Hence,
a thriving unregulated land market emerged along Yajouz
Road east of Amman (see figure 2).
In an interview with one of the people who bought
29
KMSER -
ZARQA
STuDy
AREA ()RuSEWA IA
SALT
MAHIS
i
WADI ES SIR
- S a OMUSTANDA
d SAHAB
STUDY
UDP 3
IDENTIFIED UPGRADING
AND NEW SITES
FIGURE Z
f
land in the area and built on it in 1980, he explained
why he moved from Amman to this location:
With the continuously growing population in
the Refugee camp, and the restrictions on
horizontal and vertical expansion, the
overcrowding in the camp became unbearable.
When I decided to get married, I knew I had
toleave. The cheapest place I could find for
rent was a room in an overcrowded area for 70
JD's a month,.... my salary was only 100 JD's
then. I was told by a relative about the
Yajouz Road lands. I visited the area, talked
to some tribal owners. I realized it was an
excellent opportunity, especially since the
minimum plot size restriction and all other
setback and building regulations did not
apply. I bought a 200 sq.m. plot for JDs 300
[$900).
Thus, the informal urban development on the
easternboundaries of Amman cannot be seen as a separate
phenomenon independent from the dramatic socio-economic
changes that occurred in the seventies. First, the flow
of financial capital through remittances to lower and
middle income groups trapped in refugee camps and other
overcrowded areas, provided them with the incentive to
actively seek better living conditions through
relocating. Second, as these groups sought better and
less dense areas, land values were increasing
dramatically, and most of the annexed lands were zoned
as upper income residential, thus keeping these areas
out of the reach of the middle and lower income groups.
Therefore, the only access to housing for these groups
other than renting and sharing, was to target land that
is least valuable, outside the municipalities limits,
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and under title dispute.
The only document used in such a transaction is
referred to as hujja (proof). This hujja, although
considered illegal by the Land and Survey Department,
has legal standing in the court system if two witnesses
undersign it. In this hujja, the tribal seller
guarantees to protect the buyer against the encroachment
or invasion of other tribal members or neighbors.
However, it is explicitly mentioned in the hujja that
the tribal owner cannot protect the buyer from
unpredictable state action (see copy of hujja and
translation in Appendix B).
Abu Hisham, a member of the Bani Hassans benefited
significantly from this informal market. He inherited
three hectares in the area from his father. He
subdivided these and sold two and a half hectares at
different points in time in the last ten years. He sold
a whole hectare to an extended family of settlers who
established their "own neighborhood," and the rest he
sold to individuals with areas ranging from 150 sq. m.
to 1000 sq. m.. Part of the land he kept for himself
was on the main road. He built two shops, rented them
out, and built a house on a 1000 sq. m. plot. His house
is located on the edge of the plot to allow for further
subdivision of the land.
Thus, the Bani Hassan members participate in
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illegal subdivision and sale because it comprises one of
the main sources of income to many tribal members, and
increases the value of legal holdings adjacent to the
disputed area (Jureiba).
V. THE POST 1983 PERIOD: THE STRUGGLE OVER LAND
With the fall of oil prices in the early eighties,
economic conditions changed dramatically. Grants from
the Arab countries were slashed. The contracts of
thousands of Jordanian workers in the Gulf were
terminated, leaving Jordan with an army of professionals
and skilled workers who could not be absorbed by the
limited Jordanian economy. The effect on the
speculative land market was dramatic. A large number of
completed dwellings in the upper income areas could not
be sold. The confidence in land as a secure source of
investment deteriorated. Thus, land supply exceeded
land demand and prices plunged down dramatically.
The effect land speculation had on the economy in
the long term was negative: First, agricultural
production went down as a result of the fragmentation
and urbanization of large tracts of agricultural land.
Second, industry and other productive sectors were
deprived of huge sums of capital as it all poured into
land and real estate speculation (an estimate of JD 300
million had circulated in land speculation in 1982).
Third, the availability of capital fueled consumerism
which increased the total value of imported goods in
1983 to ten fold its 1973 level. Further, the
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government was indirectly subsidizing rich developers
and land owners through the provision of infrastructure
free of charge:
Here developers/land owners get parcelation
and building loan arrangements, ask prices at
the top end of the market, and then proceed in
the confirmed knowledge that the public sector
will come along with the roads, water, power
and sewerage regardless of the cost, the low
density of the development, the number of
beneficiaries and the distortion of priorities
in geographic and socioeconomic terms (Jordan
Urban Project, 1978, 21).
The state's formulation of the conflict into a case
of land invasion has not changed the Bani Hassans'
perception of their "right" to land and their sense of
"justice". In describing similar situations, Doeble
points out that "while tenure is generally considered a
legal category, it is, just as fundamentally, a matter
of the state of mind of the persons concerned."
(Doebele, 1978:110). In this study, I argue that the
legal system has significance only as far as the state
can enforce it and, thus, force the different groups to
conform to the law of the state. However, when the
state is unable to force reality to conform to the law,
it is faced with few alternatives; it either has to
modify the law to accommodate for the other groups'
interests and perceptions of "justice," or accept a
worse situation in which a gradual divorce between the
law and its enforcement emerge, that is, a situation in
3-TN5
which other contesting groups enforce their own "laws."
Building the Land:
In 1983, a special force was created to "protect
state owned land and maintain law and order on those
lands": the Public
is caught building
yet installing the
whole structure, fi
in jail. However,
structure would be
fined and possibly
A grocer along
Land Protection Patrol. If a settler
the skeleton of the house, without
roof, the patrol would demolish the
ne the settler, and possibly put him
If the roof is installed, the
left intact, but the settler would be
jailed.
the Yajouz Road commented on the
strategies used by the settlers for building by saying
"necessity is the mother of invention." I understood
his message later as I was driving in the area on a
Thursday evening. The number of construction sites in
the area was striking. Each site was a hive of
construction workers carrying materials, digging the
earth, setting reinforcement, hammering the scaffolding,
pouring concrete. Since Friday is the official day off
in Jordan -- hence the day off for the patrol --
Thursday evenings are usually the busiest days for
construction workers in the area.
One of the construction cites was a fifty square
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meter room with ten people working on it. The owner of
the site, Abu Khalaf, a sixty-five year old man, was
working diligently with his five sons and four other
workers. He has a family of thirteen and rents two
rooms in Ruseifa for sixty Jordanian Dinars (JD 1 = $
3). Two of his sons migrated to the Arabian gulf states
in 1977 to work. They sent their father JD. 1000 in
1982 and asked him to buy a piece of land for building a
bigger house that could accommodate all the family when
the brothers get back. Such an amount was insufficient
for any piece of land in the formal market, and Abu
Khalaf had to seek the informal market and bought a 250
sq.m. plot from the disputed holdings of Bani Hassan for
JD 3 per meter. To build this house, Abu Khalaf had to
sell his small transport van for JD 1200 and borrow JD
600 from his relatives. Abu Khalaf did not believe he
was invading land, he was merely buying land that he
could afford. I asked what would happen when the patrol
found about his house on Saturday. He replied: "At
best, I will be arrested from one week to a month, and
fined 30 to 100 JD's. At worst, they will demolish the
house in addition to the arrest and the fine."
In another construction location, I talked to an
informal contractor. He said the owner of the site was
a school teacher. He was not around because he had
evening classes, but he would take part in the
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construction all Friday. Although the owner was not
around, the construction work was advancing as quickly
as on other sites. The contractor explained that he had
just as much at stake to finish over the weekend as the
owner of the site; otherwise he would run the risk of
being put in jail. Should the patrol catch a contractor
building for someone with no legal title to land, he
would be imprisoned and forced to pay a bail of 2000 JDs
before he is released. He would also have to write a
pledge (commitment) not to accept any construction jobs
on state's land. The contractor I talked to had already
been to jail once, but a small contractor in a declining
construction market had no other alternatives for work.
In a different location close to the main street,
a concrete structure was rising from behind a two meter
high earth mound. I later was told that if the road
overlooks the building site, the settlers may bring in
several truck loads of earth to form a mound to obstruct
vision from the road. This gives them the opportunity
to move in all the building materials and prepare the
foundations without being seen by the patrol.
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VI. INTERVENTION THROUGH PLANNING:
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?
In this section, I will analyze the possible
intervention policies for future planning. But first,
the existing physical characteristics of the area will
be summarized.
Physical Characteristics:
The study area is located along both sides of
Yajouz Road as it passes north of Ruseifa (see figure
3). Almost all dwellings are made with reinforced
concrete structure and concrete blocks. Most of the
dwellings are inhabited, but some are uninhabited one
room structures. These are built just to establish the
holder's right to the plot. As the road approaches
Zarqa shops start appearing on both sides of the road;
there are carpenters, car mechanics, blacksmiths, small
grocers, and bakers. The settlements get more closely
spaced. Unpaved roads and dirt tracks branch off on
both sides from the Yajouz Road to serve dwellings.
However, the roads branching on the northern side are
straight and parallel, while those on the southern side
are crooked and narrow. This is explained by the
accumulation of experience of the settlers with time,
37
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for the settlements south of Yajouz Road are somewhat
older (they date from the early seventies) than those
north of it (from the late seventies)". Building
standards seem to vary widely. In general, building
standards seem more homogeneous and simple south of the
road than north of the road, where some houses have
elaborate stone facades, while others are one-room,
unfinished concrete shelters.
As for services, a survey in the area in 1982 gave
the following percentages of households for each type of
service (cited in the Urban Development Department draft
for the third phase of proposed upgrading):
o Metered Electricity 0.0%
o Private Generators 26.3%
o Power from neighbors 7.1%
o Metered water connections 26.9%
o Sewerage connection 0.0%
Two years ago, however, the settlers submitted a
pledge to the Prime Minister demanding paved roads,
schools, clinics, public transportation, and
electricity. Some of these demands were met (see
appendix C). Most of the dwellings south of the road
are connected to metered electricity, where they have to
4 See D. Collier, Squatters and Oligarchs, 1976:
13 for a similar description of how the early settlers
become more concerned about the layout of the roads and
self-imposed setbacks, etc.
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pay a 35 JD yearly fee plus user charge (one Jordanian
dinar is equivalent to three dollars). However, areas
north of the road have to pay not only the yearly 35 JD
plus user charge to get formally connected to the main
system, but also a 75 JD price of an electricity steel
pole. Thus., few people north of the road are connected
to metered electricity. The rest are connected to
private generators. All households I interviewed said
they were connected to metered water.
Explaining the Phenomenon
One of the main arguments here is that the informal
urban development on the eastern boundaries of Amman
cannot be seen as a phenomenon independent of the
dramatic socio-economic changes that occurred in the
seventies: Financial capital flowing into the country
was mostly invested in land. This induced land
speculation and price inflation. Through remittances,
lower and middle income groups were able to share some
of the fruits of the economic boom. As a consequence,
they started seeking better living conditions. These
groups found limited alternatives to enhance their
living conditions as most of the annexed lands were
zoned as upper income residential areas, thus keeping
these areas out of the reach of the middle and lower
income groups.
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The State's Policy for Legalizing Tenure:
Today, all the area south of Yajouz Road has been
annexed by the Ruseifa municipality (see figure 4). The
area north of the road, however, is still outside the
municipal boundaries. Knowing about other Jordanian
municipalities' love affair with land annexation, I was
wondering why the municipality of Ruseifa was reluctant
to annex the area north of Ruseifa until it was
ordered to do so by the central government in 1983, and
when it did, it only reached up to Yajouz road and not
north of it.
The actual legalization of tenure south of the road
was being carried by the municipality of Ruseifa in
collaboration with the Land and Survey department.
The Mayor of Ruseifa, in an interview said that the
annexed areas were "plagued" with endless problems in
relation to the legalization of tenure. He could not
see how the municipality by itself with its limited
resources could take charge of legalizing a larger area
than the existing one south of the road. He said for a
comprehensive solution, "more coordination among the
different government bodies to mitigate the negative
aspects of the informal settlements, to stop their
future expansion, and to legalize the tenure of existing
settlements as soon as possible, will be needed." For
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more details, I was referred to the municipality's
engineer, who was responsible for the physical aspects
of the legalization.
My first question to the engineer was why the
annexation came too late and was so limited. He
explained that annexing an already built-up area that
requires services, and infrastructure, and has tenure
problems is the last thing any municipality would want
to get involved in. It was later obvious, however, that
Ruseifa has no other alternative but to expand in that
direction since it is bounded by Amman city boundaries
from the west, Zarqa city boundaries from the east, and
a military zone to the south. Further, when public land
is annexed by a municipality, the control of that land
remains under the central government. Thus, the
municipality has no interest in annexing public land.
In other words, if land south and north of Yajouz Road
had been privately owned, or publicly owned but
allocated directly by the central government to the
municipality, the municipality would have had a
considerable interest in annexing it. Now the
municipality is "burdened" with the area south of the
Yajouz Road, and is hoping the northern part of the road
would be annexed by the Zarqa municipality so that the
burden gets shared. I asked to see the master plan for
the annexed area. Ironically, most of the empty areas
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were designated as "Residential B", a zoning category
with large residential plots (750- 1000 sq.m.), generous
set backs, and building standards.
As for the legalization process, a survey team maps
the existing layout of the roads and settlements, the
settlers names are recorded next to their houses. Then
the municipality offers the settler legal title in
exchange for paying the Badal Mithl (equivalent) of the
land price plus the registration fees. Empty plots,
however, are registered automatically as public land
(treasury) regardless of who claims the land.
But how successful has the intervention policy of
the state been? As was seen in the previous section,
preventing the settlers from building has had limited
success so far. For one, the stock of "illegal" houses
in the area is steadily increasing rather than
decreasing. As for the legalization strategy, the
municipality's engineer maintained that less than 20% of
the dwellings in the area south of the road have paid
the Badal Mithl (equivalent) required to transfer the
title to private freehold. The rest have defaulted.
Now, the government has given a grace period for one
more year and divided it up into four yearly payments.
Further, and to urge people to pay, a 100% penalty
charge on each delayed payment will be added to the
total Badal Mithl. With all that, the municipality
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engineer still thinks people will default from payment.
He said: "Some of them simply do not have the money,
and others don't see the benefits of it."
Implications for Future Planning:
A packaged solution of the dispute is not one of
the objectives of this study. However, the following
points are meant as guidelines for solutions addressing
the actual problems in the area:
1. Basing policies on the concept of "invaded" land is
likely to produce inapplicable and unjust polices such
as expecting settlers to pay twice for their land,
preventing them from building, or expropriating the land
without compensation.
2. The legal category of land tenure is of little use
when a solution of the conflict is being sought. As
Doebele points out, "The critical element may not so
much be the precise legal category involved as the
perception of the occupant of his security in relation
to the investment contemplated" (Doebele, 1978: 111).
3. Following from the first point, no specific tenure
system is "good or bad except as viewed as to its actual
effects at a given time and under given circumstances"
(Doebele, 1978: 123). Thus, the choice of the tenure
system should take into consideration the residents'
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perception of "justice," the future needs of the
government for public land, and the land uses sought.
4. This study suggests a relation between legalization
of tenure and consolidation that is opposed to the
common wisdom in the field of planning. The common
wisdom suggests that legalizing tenure releases saved
capital by the residents and allows for consolidation.
The opposite was found in this case; residents do not
obtain security of tenure unless they consolidate. that
is , once a reinforced concrete structure is built and a
permanent roof is installed, the settler feels
relatively secure about his investment. In contrast, as
long as the land is not built or does not have a
permanent structure, the settler is under the threat of
losing all rights to the land. This could be the case
in other countries which base their land code on Islamic
religious law, where establishing the "use" of land for
a certain period of time gives the "user" permanent
rights to it.
5. The area's "highest and best use" is low income
residential; the phosphate it used to have was depleted
in the mid seventies, it is not agricultural, and it is
located between three cities which employ most of the
population. Further, it already houses around two
hundred thousand people of middle and lower income
groups.
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6. The state's legalizing the tenure by turning it
into individual freehold involves several repercussions:
First, if the same conventional approach is used in
zoning, subdivision regulations, and building codes, the
effect would be to limit the ability of middle and lower
income groups to obtain housing and land. This was
shown in the area annexed by the Ruseifa municipality
where most of the empty plots were zoned as low density,
upper income residential plots. As for the existing
buildings, limitations on vertical and horizontal
expansion will be introduced. This will render the area
as a whole much less responsive to future demand for low
income housing, a pressing present and future need of
the urban masses.
Second, private freehold will bring the land prices
in the area to the formal land market level and
introduce speculation. The tribal members will be able
to monopolize and control the price and transfer of land
in the area.
7. The physical conditions in the area require minimum
intervention by planners. In fact, in the newer areas
north of the Yajouz Road, there is an impressive
accumulation of experience in terms of the organization
of site and self imposed physical regulations. Front
and back set-backs, strait and uniform roads, and a
range of realistic standards are being used by the
47
residents. Early residents in an area negotiate with
new comers to follow the preliminary layout of the
street and use minimum setbacks. The areas of plots per
household range from 80 sq.m. to 1000 sq.m.; however, a
dwelling on a large plot is usually built on the edge of
the plot to allow for future subdivision. Most
services, except paved roads, are available. This
implies that only minimum levels of intervention are
needed in the area.
B. Finally, and as far as the law is concerned, new
forms of land tenure should be conceived of that take
into consideration the traditional claims, the current
realities, and future directions. Further, a different
approach to land forms of property taxation could be
conceived instead of direct recovery of land value.
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Receipts of agricultural taxes dating back to 1949
and 1954 collected from the Bani Hassan tribe for
cultivating Uti ez-Zarcia and Ruseif a. These receipts
were used by the Bani Hassans as a proof that they had
possession of the area during that period.
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APPENDIX B
In The Name of God the Merciful
Proof (Huija) of Land Sale
First Party: M. Mufleh and S. Suleiman
Second Party: A. Mustaf a Saleh
The agreement has been made to buy a plot of an
area of 650 sq.m. which is located north of Ruseifa,
north of Yajouz Road
The full payment has been made.
Boundaries: North
South
East
West
Gazi, the brother of Salma
The same seller
Hmoud Awad and his partners
5 meter wide road
Conditions: The first party will give up his rights to
this plot, and he is obliged to protect the buyer from
the tribe (clan), or the neighbors. The seller is not
responsible for protecting the buyer from the state or
any other official authority. Further, the seller is
not responsible for future fees (penalties). According
to this statement, an agreement has been made witnessed
by the undersigned and by God, and God is the best
witness of all.
30/ 9/ 1975
Selling Party Buying Party
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APPENDIX C
In the Name of God the Merciful
The honorable Prime Minister Amman,
221 9/ 1986
Amman - Jordan
Dear Sir:
We the residents of Hay al-Rasheed in the city of
Ruseifa extend our respect and appreciation to your
person wishing you more strength and advancement under
the rein of His Majesty King Hussein, petition your
excellency to urge for the legalization of this
neighborhood which is inhabited by thousands of
citizens. This neighborhood lacks all the necessary
services and mainly electricity, for one of the
residents has a private electricity generator and sells
us each Kilo for 110 Fils, although the Jordan
Electricity Company Poles extend through our
neighborhood. Also, the roads are unpaved; dusty in
summer, muddy in winter which prevents us from reaching
our homes.
There are no primary schools for our children, and
other schools are too far. There are no telephone
services although the telephone lines pass next to our
neighborhood.
Hoping your excellency will extend help, God bless
you.
Signatures:
(forty five signatures)
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